By Brian Mugenyi
Kampala: The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government, Mr Ben Kumumanya, has spent more than three decades inside Uganda’s decentralisation experiment, a system formally launched in 1992 to transfer decision-making and responsibilities closer to citizens.
Now, following the election of village Local Council I chairpersons, the same grassroots architecture could provide Uganda with a powerful new layer in the fight against corruption in local government.
The Electoral Commission led by Justice Simon Mugenyi Byabakama conducted the 2026 LC1 elections across 71,214 villages, with polling successfully completed in 70,079 villages, representing 98.4 per cent of the targeted villages.
The significance of the elections, however, goes beyond restoring elected leadership.
It is about restoring a citizen’s ability to know what is happening in his or her village, identify problems early and demand answers from the institutions responsible.
From the management of community information and public programmes to monitoring service delivery and reporting suspected abuse of public resources, the new LC1 councils are potentially positioned at the point where corruption is easiest to detect—where government meets the citizen.
For Mr Kumumanya, that is the essence of decentralisation.
The Ministry has described LC1 and LC2 leadership as the “bedrock” of Uganda’s decentralised governance system, arguing that the structures bring leadership and decision-making closer to citizens and enable communities to participate in identifying priorities, monitoring public services and holding leaders accountable.
The 1992 idea meets the 2026 village
Uganda’s decentralisation reform dates to 1992, when Government embarked on a far-reaching transfer of responsibilities to local governments.
The reform was built around a deceptively simple proposition: government becomes more responsive when decisions are taken closer to the people affected by them.
More than three decades later, that proposition is facing another test.
The country now has 71,214 villages, according to the Electoral Commission’s 2026 election preparations.
Each village represents a community with people, households, public services, government programmes, land, roads, water sources, schools and economic activities.
And each has elected grassroots leadership.
This creates a potential accountability network stretching from the village to the parish, sub-county, town council, municipality, district and ultimately the central government.
The question is whether Uganda can make that network work.
The Constitution gives citizens the mandate
The anti-corruption argument for LC1 councils is not simply political.
It has a constitutional foundation.
Article 176 of the Constitution provides that decentralisation shall apply at all levels of local government to ensure “people’s participation and democratic control in decision making.”
It further requires local governments to oversee the performance of government employees providing services in their areas and to monitor the provision of government services and implementation of projects.
That provision is important.
It means decentralisation was never intended merely to create more offices.
It was designed to create a governance system in which citizens participate and local institutions monitor what happens around them.
The Constitution goes even further in its accountability principles.
It states that all public offices are held in trust for the people and that persons in positions of leadership and responsibility are answerable to the people.
It also requires lawful measures to expose, combat and eradicate corruption and abuse or misuse of power by those holding political and public offices.
For the new LC1 councils, this creates both a democratic opportunity and a responsibility.
From the village register to accountability
One of the less celebrated but important functions of grassroots governance is knowing who lives in a community.
The Electoral Commission itself undertook the verification of residents and compilation of the Village Residents’ Register in all 71,214 villages before the 2026 elections.
Such community-level information can become valuable when government is trying to identify beneficiaries, trace residents, resolve administrative questions or establish who was present when an incident occurred.
But this must not be confused with giving LC1 chairpersons authority to adjudicate land ownership or independently investigate criminal cases.
For example, where there is a dispute over the sale or occupation of land, village leaders may possess useful information about the parties, residence and community circumstances, but ownership and registration remain matters governed by the relevant land laws and competent authorities.
That distinction matters.
The LC1 council is a first point of community information—not a substitute for courts, land offices, auditors, police or anti-corruption agencies.
When corruption begins with a small transaction
Corruption also does not always announce itself through a multimillion-shilling scandal.
It can begin with a small demand for money.
A person may be asked to pay before accessing a government service.
A beneficiary may be told to give a percentage of a programme allocation.
A public official may manipulate a list of beneficiaries.
A community may be told that a project has been completed when residents can see that it has not.
The person most likely to know something is wrong may be the person living next door.
That is where the LC1 council becomes important.
A resident can raise the complaint.
The council can document and channel it.
The sub-county or district can investigate administratively where appropriate.
Auditors, inspectors, the Inspectorate of Government, police or other competent institutions can take action within their mandates.
The village therefore becomes the first warning point, rather than the final court of accountability.
Kumumanya’s warning to local leaders
Mr Kumumanya has recently reminded local government trainers that public office carries personal responsibility.
Citing Article 164 of the Constitution, he told trainers that leaders who misuse public resources or cause financial loss through actions contrary to established instructions can be held personally accountable and required to make good the loss, even after leaving office.
The warning is significant for the new councils.
It establishes that leadership is not merely an opportunity to exercise authority.
It is a fiduciary responsibility.
Public resources are held in trust.
And public office has consequences.
That message is consistent with the Ministry’s wider anti-corruption drive.
The Ministry’s reform agenda
The Ministry of Local Government has increasingly placed integrity, transparency and institutional reform at the centre of its local-government agenda.
In March 2026, Mr Kumumanya engaged District and City Service Commissions on strengthening integrity and addressing administrative weaknesses.
He told the commissions:
“Service Commissions must remain firm and independent in executing their mandate. Any form of interference or corruption should be reported immediately.”
The Ministry has also been working with oversight institutions to strengthen accountability in recruitment and human-resource management.
This is important because corruption in local government can begin before an officer even occupies a public office.
If jobs are bought, the public ultimately pays.
Mr Kumumanya has therefore linked merit-based recruitment, institutional independence and anti-corruption enforcement.
The Ministry has also announced reforms to strengthen the legal and administrative framework governing local governments, including ongoing discussions around amendments to the Local Government Act.
Leonard Imanishimwe: councils must be scrutinised.
The argument is also supported by the public-accountability perspective.
During a Media Challenge Initiative training in June, Mr Leonard Imanishimwe, a lecturer in Public Accountability, argued that corruption can be confronted through stronger scrutiny and accountability of councils by the authorities responsible for supervising local government.
His argument places the LC1 council within a broader chain of accountability.
The council itself must be accountable.
The sub-county must supervise.
The district must inspect.
The Ministry must coordinate, monitor and guide.
Oversight institutions must investigate where necessary.
And political leadership must ensure that the system does not tolerate impunity.
This is important because decentralisation without accountability can merely decentralise the opportunity for abuse.
The PDM and grassroots test
The Parish Development Model (PDM) provides one of the clearest tests.
Government has moved significant resources towards parish-level economic transformation.
Mr Kumumanya has specifically instructed trainers to ensure that councils understand their role in mobilising communities, providing oversight and ensuring that programmes such as PDM and Emyooga deliver tangible benefits.
At village level, the new councils can help citizens understand:
Who qualifies?
What is the programme supposed to provide?
Who has received support?
Were beneficiaries asked for money?
What happened to those who were left out?
Where should complaints be reported?
These questions may appear simple.
But they are powerful.
They convert citizens from passive recipients into informed participants.
The danger: turning every disagreement into corruption
There is, however, a line the new LC1 councils must not cross.
They should not become village courts of public accusation.
Political rivalry should not be confused with corruption.
A disagreement should not automatically become a criminal allegation.
And suspicion should not be presented as proof.
The proper approach is:
Listen.
Document.
Verify.
Report.
Follow up.
That approach protects both the citizen and the public servant.
It also ensures that allegations reach institutions with the legal mandate to investigate and determine responsibility.
The Ministry’s current anti-corruption operations demonstrate this principle. During recent inspections, allegations and concerns raised by citizens have been documented and referred to relevant institutions, with the Ministry emphasising due process for anyone implicated.
Why the village can make a difference
The LC1 council has something larger institutions cannot easily manufacture.
Proximity.
The chairperson lives among the residents.
The councillors know the community.
The residents know the projects.
They know the beneficiaries.
They know whether a facility is functioning.
They know whether a road exists.
They know whether a water source works.
And they know when something does not look right.
This does not make them investigators.
It makes them eyes and ears of participatory governance.
If that information is responsibly channelled through the appropriate administrative and legal structures, it can help authorities act before small abuses become large losses.
From elections to an accountability culture
The 2026 LC1 elections should therefore not be judged simply by the number of chairpersons elected.
They should be judged by what happens after the election.
Do citizens attend community meetings?
Do councils explain government programmes?
Do leaders monitor service delivery?
Do they protect public property?
Do they report suspected corruption?
Do technical officers respond to legitimate complaints?
Do higher authorities act on credible information?
And, most importantly, do citizens begin to believe that speaking about corruption can produce results?
That is the deeper test.
The Kumumanya challenge
For Mr Kumumanya, the restoration of elected grassroots leadership provides an opportunity to reconnect the original philosophy of decentralisation with modern accountability.
The idea born in 1992 was that citizens should have a greater role in shaping the affairs of their communities.
The challenge in 2026 is to make that participation meaningful.
A council that merely meets has not necessarily strengthened democracy.
A council that helps citizens understand government programmes, monitors services, safeguards public property and reports credible concerns has.
The difference is accountability.
And accountability is where the anti-corruption battle becomes real.
The final test is the citizen
Uganda does not lack institutions responsible for fighting corruption.
It has the Inspectorate of Government.
The Auditor General.
Police.
The courts.
Internal auditors.
Procurement structures.
District and City Service Commissions.
The Ministry of Local Government.
The challenge is connecting these institutions to the citizen who first sees something going wrong.
The new LC1 councils could provide that connection.
They could become the point where a citizen’s observation becomes a documented complaint; where a community concern becomes an administrative inquiry; and where a genuine case is escalated to an institution with the power to investigate.
That is the real promise of the 2026 LC1 elections.
Not simply that Uganda has elected 71,214 village-level councils, but that it has restored a vast network through which citizens can participate in governance and demand accountability.
The fight against corruption will not be won by circulars alone.
It will not be won by inspections alone.
It will not be won by arrests alone.
It will be won when laws, institutions, leaders and citizens work together.
And that is why the village matters.
Because corruption may be committed in an office somewhere up the administrative chain, but its consequences are eventually felt by the people at the bottom.
The new LC1 councils now have an opportunity to reverse that journey.
From the village to the district.
From the district to the Ministry.
From information to scrutiny.
From scrutiny to accountability.
And, ultimately, from decentralisation as an administrative idea to decentralisation as a living system in which the citizen can ask the most important question in public service:**
“Where did our money go—and what did we get for it?”
